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Abstract
We argue that community networks played an important role in the emergence of Indian entrepreneurship
in the early stages of the cotton textile and jute textile industries in the late 19th and early 20th century
respectively, overcoming the lack of market institutions and government support. From business registers,
we construct a yearly panel dataset of entrepreneurs in these two industries. We find no evidence that entry
is affected by prior trading experience or price shocks in the corresponding upstream sector. Firm directors
exhibited a high degree of clustering of entrepreneurs by community. The dynamics of entry is consistent
with a model of network-based dynamics.
1 Introduction
Historical differences in the timing and the determinants of industrialization across countries has been
an important area of research in economic history. Most of this research has focused on developed
countries. The first industrial revolution in Britain was market-driven, with atomistic agents setting up
industrial firms. Entrepreneurs responded to high wages and adopted capital intensive technology (Allen
2009). The intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment generated useful knowledge by skilled workmen
and inventors that could be used effectively by potential entrepreneurs in an institutional setting that
provided the right incentives (Mokyr 2009). The state did not intervene directly to promote industri-
alization. Secure property rights and a Parliament enacting favourable laws secured well-functioning
markets in a period of radical technological and social transformation (Bogart and Richardson 2008).
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In contrast, countries like Germany and United States saw more direct involvement of the state. High
tariffs on manufactured goods to protect infant industries were widely used in both countries. In 1875,
the average tariff in the USA was about 30% and in Germany 6%. After the tariff reform of 1879
in Germany, the average rate of tariff rose to 8% and the average tariff on manufactured goods was
13% in 1913 (O’Rourke 2000). Webb (1980) estimated effective protection for the German iron and
steel industry at 37-70% at the turn of the century, one of the key industries of the second industrial
revolution of the late 19th century. In 1885, some of the highest tariff rates were in the United States:
40% on cotton textile, 35% on iron and steel and over 70% on sugar, spirits and tobacco (Irwin 2007).
In more backward countries such as Russia, industries developed in the 1890s with the state creating
a favourable environment (Markevich and Nafziger 2017). Spending on industrial development was
very small, but tariffs were raised across the board to increase revenue as well as to protect industry.
The government subsidized railway construction and had favourable policies to attract foreign capital
(Kahan 1967). In Japan after the Meiji restoration of 1868, the state coordinated interactions between
the financial sector and industry, facilitated import of machinery and technological know-how as well as
quick adoption and dissemination of new technology. A tax reform in 1873 that discontinued payments
to the samurai, made way for investment in the modern sector (Perkins and Tang 2017). Policies towards
industrialization in Japan and later on in East Asia exemplify interventions by developmental states
when markets are missing. The state regulated entry, subsidized credit and provided tax incentives to
favoured industries.
Countries that are less developed today were slower to industrialize, in the absence of both well-
functioning markets and interventionist states. However, the vacuum has often been filled by ethnic
networks which exchange intermediate inputs, share know-how, connections and capital; overcoming
contractual moral hazards via informal community enforcement mechanisms. The importance of com-
munity networks in solving contract enforcement in trade has been eloquently described in the work of
Greif (2006). Social networks have been instrumental in economic activity in Africa (Fafchamps 2003)
and in Chinese trade (Rauch 2003). However, the role of community networks in early industrialization
of less developed countries has not received comparable emphasis in the literature. Section 2 describes
historical evidence on the limited role of state and market institutions in 19th century industrialization
in India, suggesting a possible role of community networks in filling this gap.
In the Indian context, social networks are defined by occupation based caste or religious groups.
These groups engaged in the same occupation, married within the group; intra-group relationships
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manifested high levels of trust, mutual help, economic transactions and sharing of information. Indian
caste networks have been important in credit and insurance (Banerjee and Munshi 2004; Munshi 2011).
Social networks also play a role in labour markets as shown in the context of hiring and referrals
(Beaman and Magruder 2012) as well as migration flows (Munshi 2003). Gupta (2014) shows that
British and Indian networks in early industrialization in India were typically segregated into different
sectors. Business historians have accumulated case study evidence on entry into industry from trade
starting from the second half of the 19th century (Goswami 1985; Rudner 1994, and Timberg 1978;
Tripathi and Mehta 1990; Tripathi 2004). This literature focused on particular entrepreneurs and their
communities. A limitation of these rich historical accounts is the lack of quantification. There is no
systematic evidence for the industrial sector as a whole or any particular industry at the entrepreneur
level.
In this paper, we focus principally on the cotton textile industry, the leading industry in the 19th
century where Indian entrepreneurs emerged; we also later examine the early evolution of Indian en-
trepreneurs in the jute industry after 1918. For both industries, we construct a yearly panel dataset
from business registers of directors of listed firms in upstream and downstream activities of the con-
cerned industry, and code their respective community identities from their names. This enables us to
construct a yearly panel data set of active entrepreneurs by community, track their backgrounds prior
to entering the downstream industry and examine patterns of community homophily in the composition
of firms. We use this evidence to understand the role of community networks in the process of entry
into the downstream industry, while controlling for the role of price and other industry-wide shocks
and community characteristics such as prior experience, literacy, population size or outside options.1
We use two pieces of quantitative evidence to assess the role of communities. First, we examine
the extent to which entrepreneurs clustered by community within firms. Given the high degree of
interdependence among entrepreneurs within the same firms, this is a natural way to assess the extent
to which problems of trust and cooperation among principal shareholders and executive officers were
overcome by partnering with members of the same community. Second, we test a model of entry
dynamics based on productivity-enhancing help provided by incumbent entrepreneurs to new entrants
from their own community. The model is appropriate for early stages of industrialization with stable
market growth and a given set of communities with stocks of potential entrepreneurs with stationary
1The data pertains to the stock of active entrepreneurs in different years, which includes the effects of entry as well as
exit. However, entry flows dominate exits, so we interpret changes in the stock of active agents as reflecting entry forces
throughout the paper.
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outside options. Such early stages are typically characterized by growing incumbent stocks from each
community. The model generates network-based dynamics of the incumbent stock which exponentially
amplify over time differences in initial presence of different communities. The network effect can be
identified by the presence of a non-linear divergence effect for incumbent stocks, while controlling
for year dummies (which include the effect of price and other industry-wide shocks) and community
dummies (which capture differences in community-specific characteristics such as education, ability,
wealth and outside options).
Besides community networks, we also examine the role of some other factors argued by some authors
to be relevant for emergence of early industrial entrepreneurship, such as pre-industrial accumulation
of wealth (Marx 1887, Banerjee and Newman 1993) or experience in related upstream trading sectors
(Sutton and Kellow 2010, Sutton and Kpentey 2012).
We start by examining evidence for emergence of entrepreneurship in cotton textiles for the first
three decades following 1860. Industry price movements do not play a significant role in predicting
entry patterns, nor do prior upstream presence of the community during the US Civil War (a proxy
for prior trading experience and profit). 66% of entrepreneurs active during 1860-70 had no prior
upstream experience in baling and trading raw cotton, a proportion which rose to 79% and 91% in the
subsequent two decades. On the other hand, we find a high degree of community-based clustering of
entrepreneurs in the composition of downstream firms: on average 60% or more entrepreneurs belonged
to the same community within any firm. The evolution of presence of active entrepreneurs from different
communities during early stages exhibited the nonlinear amplification of early community presence
predicted by the network model. We use yearly data for stocks of active entrepreneurs at the community
level from 1866 until 1890. The nonlinear network effect is statistically significant and quantitatively
large: an additional active entrepreneur from a given community in 1866 was associated with 1.6
additional entrepreneurs from the same community in 1880, and 4.4 additional entrepreneurs in 1890.
The assumptions of the network-based model ceased to apply after 1890, owing to saturation of
entrepreneurs from each community in Greater Bombay where most of the entry since 1860 had been
located. The period from 1890-1910 featured entry in a cascade-like manner by a single (Vania) com-
munity outside the Greater Bombay area, following a drop in profitability of moneylending activities,
their principal (prior) outside option. The evolution of community stocks is therefore no longer suc-
cessfully predicted by the network dynamic model using 1865 as the initial year. However, the new
firms of this specific community in the new locations exhibited even stronger clustering than those that
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had entered earlier. Hence community networks continued to characterize the evolution of the cotton
textile industry all the way until 1910. Thereafter the industry saw very little increase in the stock
of entrepreneurs in these two locations with the onset of the First World War, followed by a decline
during the interwar period.
We go on to examine entry patterns of Indian entrepreneurs into the downstream jute industry, which
occurred in Eastern India after the end of the First World War. The subsequent decade witnessed a
spurt of entry by entrepreneurs from different Indian communities, a process interrupted by the onset
of the Great Depression during the early 1930s. We therefore examine the data for entry into jute
for the period 1919-1930, and find patterns remarkably similar to those observed earlier in the cotton
textile industry. Pre-industrial presence in the upstream trading sector during the First World War did
not correlate with subsequent entry into the downstream sector; nor do price movements help explain
these entry patterns following 1919. Firms exhibited high degrees of clustering by community for newly
entering Indian entrepreneurs; the dynamic network continues to successfully predict the evolution of
entrepreneur stocks.
Section 2 describes the historical background of the emergence of industrial entrepreneurship in
India during the 19th century, and the role of various communities in Western India that played a
role in the development of the cotton textile industry. Section 3 explains the data and provides some
relevant descriptive statistics for the cotton industry. The theoretical model is presented in Section 4,
and the empirical results for the cotton industry in Section 5. Section 6 then provides evidence from
the jute industry after the First World War, while Section 7 concludes.
2 Emergence of Indian Entrepreneurship in the 19th Century
From the middle of the 19th century, modern enterprises were set up in banking and insurance, coal
and gold mines, tea and coffee plantations and also manufacturing industries such as cotton and jute
textiles. In the 1850s, a cotton textile firm set up by an Indian entrepreneur in Bombay and a jute
textile firm was set up by a British entrepreneur in Calcutta. But industrial investment did not pick up
for another decade. Table 1 shows the importance of banking and insurance in investment in companies
registered in India (Rupee Companies) in the early phase. By 1880s, Rupee investments were more
diversified. Textiles, including cotton and jute, had emerged as the largest sector; by 1900 it accounted
for just under half of total Rupee investment.
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Table 1: Share of Modern Sectors in Paid up Capital raised in India (%)
Banking & Transport Mining & Textiles Food
Insurance Plantation Industries
1851-65 35 7 20 12 0.6
1881 14 5 23 37 2
1890 13 8 19 46 1.8
1900 13 9 14 47 1.6
Source: Rungta 1970 (Appendix 8, 17)
Note: Textiles include the upstream and downstream of cotton and jute
(95% of the mills are classified as specializing in one product until 1865,
thereafter 60%). Rungta (p284-85) notes that many of the firms were clas-
sified as multiple textiles if they showed capacity to produce more than one
variety: cotton, jute, hemp, silk and wool. In practice only six produced a
variety. The rest produced cotton textiles or jute textiles.
The two main cities of industrial development were Bombay in Western India and Calcutta in the
east. Industrial investment was segregated British owned companies in Calcutta and Indian owned
companies in Bombay. The development of a major import substituting industry, cotton textiles in
Bombay, was initiated by Indian entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs came from Indian trading com-
munities in and around the city of Bombay. Cotton textiles was the largest sector, employing 17% of
the workforce in Bombay city in 1901.
By early 19th century several trading communities had a presence in and around Bombay city. The
Bombay Presidency comprised of the modern provinces of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Surat had been
the early settlement of the East India Company. Bombay became the next major settlement in western
India. Individuals from different trading communities acted as agents of the company and worked as
contacts between the Company and the local consumers and producers. A few of these traders were
involved in the Indian Ocean trade and became the main exporters of opium to China. Others were
involved in local banking and money lending. The hinterland of Bombay was Indias cotton producing
region. Raw cotton from the region was sold in the regional market and exported to Europe in periods
of high demand. There were five Indian communities in Bombay city by mid 19th century: Parsis,
Bhatias, Hindu Vanias and Jains2, Baghdadi Jews, Bohra and Khoja Muslims, besides the Europeans.
The American civil war of 1861-65, saw a big rise in export of raw cotton from India to Britain,
as India replaced the United States as a source of raw cotton for the British textile industry. This
provided a big impetus for investment in cotton press and baling to prepare raw cotton for export.
2Though belonging to different religions, the term Vanias is used for both Hindus and Jains trading groups.
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With the end of the civil war, exports declined and the trade in raw cotton became less profitable. The
following decades saw entry into the downstream industry of textile production. After legalization of
limited liability joint stock companies, investment in joint stock companies in cotton textiles became an
attractive option, and cotton mills were set up in the city of Bombay. A number of early entrepreneurs
were from the Parsi community. But other Indian merchant communities of Bombay were also present.
European firms had a larger presence in the upstream sector of cotton press and baling that sold raw
cotton for export. In the downstream industry, their presence was overshadowed by the Indian merchant
groups. Morris (1982, p.580) suggests that European capital did not exceed more than 10-20% of total
investment in the industry in Bombay.
Community as a Source of Capital
The cost of setting up a cotton mill was significant. Although there was a formal banking sector and
the Indian trading communities had shares in banks, the latter did not provide long term capital to
industry; their lending was limited to short term working capital loans. The business historian Tripathi
(2004) writes:
“The tight hold of the mercantile interests on the sources of industrial finance could have
been loosened, had there been an efficiently functioning stock market and an alternative
source of credit, such as banks organized on modern lines. Such institutions were woefully
underdeveloped at the turn of the century.”
There was no formal stock exchange before 1875. Shares were sold by a handful of brokers in the
metropolitan cities in open spaces. The value of individual shares was typically high and was typically
bought by wealthy merchants and European residents in India. When the Bombay stock exchange was
established in 1875, the number of brokers increased and the value of the average share came down,
making purchase of stocks more widely available. High dividends of 10-15% offered by textile firms,
made such investment comparable to the profit rate in trade and money lending (Rungta 1970, p.158).
At the same time, community connections were important in selling shares. The capital for the first
cotton mill in Bombay, set up by Parsi entrepreneur C.N. Davar was raised by 50 of Bombays leading
merchants; the majority of investors were Parsis (Morris 1983, p. 574). When Ranchhodlal tried to
set up a textile firm, merchants in Ahmedabad were not willing to invest in his firm. Ranchhodlal, a
Brahmin by caste, was an outsider to the local merchant communities. Similarly, when Tata, a Parsi,
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offered shares of the first cotton mills outside Bombay city to a prominent Marwari trader, the response
was negative (Tripathi 2004, p. 121). Even for a late entrant in 1897 such as Lalbhai from the Jain
community, friends and family were the main source of capital (Tripathi and Mehta 1990, p. 90). The
capital market thus remained highly segmented despite the presence of a stock exchange. To quote Roy
and Swamy (2016, p.146):
“The typical industrial firm in 1900 was a company with shareholding of family and friends
as well as the public and managed by another firm, which was a partnership or a company
closely held by the same family or on rarer occasions, a trust. The company had a legal
entity as a public body, but it was managed like personal property.”
Machinery had to be imported and information about purchase of textile machinery was necessary.
The potential entrepreneurs often lacked knowledge of the technology of textile production and also
needed trained technicians from Britain to set up and run the mills. Information was an important
component in decisions to become a textile entrepreneur. A few early entrepreneurs had set up links
with the cotton machinery producers for machinery and engineering support.
Credit to buy machinery was also available from the machinery producers in Britain (Rutnagar
1927, p 9) From the 1890s, several agencies were set up that made it possible to start a textile mill
without going directly to a machinery producer in Britain (Rungta 1970, pp. 157-8). But these agencies
did not appear during the period we are considering (1860-90), so the early entrepreneurs could not
acquire knowhow by engaging agents from the market. Information was passed on mainly through
social connections.
Community as a Substitute for Contract Enforcement and State Intervention
In 1858, India came under Crown rule. This ended the 100-year rule of the East India Company and
formally integrated India into the free trade regime of the British Empire. Under Company rule, the
share of revenue from trade taxes had been small. As a part of the Empire, India committed to the
principles of free trade. At this point, British exports to India incurred tariffs of 5% on cotton piece
goods and 3.5% on yarn. This was increased substantially in 1859 as revenue concerns overrode the free
trade argument; on piece goods they were raised to 10% and on yarn to 5% (Harnetty 1972, p.7-10). The
increase in import duties was strongly resisted by Manchester Chamber of Commerce. Under Crown
rule, the British state in India was receptive to political lobbying by British interest groups. By 1862,
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tariffs on cotton textiles had been lowered to the previous level (Harnetty 1972, p.26). Manchester also
wanted compensating excise on Indian products on the ground that the 5% tariff offered protection
to Indian producers which was contrary to the principles of free trade. Tariffs for revenue purposes
combined with a countervailing excise tax on import competing goods in India was seen to conform
to free trade principles and this was what Manchester lobbied for. Accordingly In 1882, import duties
on cotton goods were scrapped altogether. Until the first World War, whenever import duties were
imposed on cotton goods, countervailing excise on locally produced cotton textiles were also imposed.
The early development of the Indian cotton textile industry was therefore not aided by protective tariffs
as in the case of early industrialization experiences of USA, Germany and Russia.
British cotton textile interests also lobbied to get factory legislation in India in 1892. The legislation
restricted working hours and employment of women and children, so that potential Indian entrepreneurs
did not enjoy any advantage. Indian entrepreneurs opposed the excise duty and were critical of the
Factory Act, but had no political voice at this time.
The second problem faced in industry and trade was contract enforcement. Legal institutions in
the middle of the 19th century were weak. There was no civil code for contract enforcement. During
Company rule, problems related to contract enforcement appeared in different contexts: from the
procurement of textiles from weavers to cultivation of opium and indigo, the East India Company
adopted ad hoc solutions using customary systems. The Indian Contract Act was passed in 1872, but
as with other legal interventions, it did not create an institutional setting similar to that in Britain. Roy
and Swamy (2016) argue that Indian traders, creditors, and manufacturers largely continued to rely on
pre-existing community norms and institutions that were outside the structure of formal British-Indian
law. Community networks as described by Greif (2006) were the primary means of contract enforcement
in trade and industry for the caste and religion based communities. Information and trust through the
community network became a substitute for well-functioning public institutions.
Trading Communities in Bombay
The five principal trading communities comprised the Parsis, a small group of Zoroastrians who had
migrated from Persia from the 8th century, the Hindu Vanias and Jains involved in trade and mon-
eylending, the Muslim communities of Bohras and Khojas, Jews who had migrated from Baghdad in
the 18th century and the Bhatias, a small Hindu sub-caste. The Vanias and Jains were characterised
by a high degree of economic and social interactions (including inter-marriage), and will thus be treated
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as a single community group that we will hereafter refer to as Vanias. These five groups differed in
initial endowments, e.g., education and specific sectors where they were active: some of them traded in
opium and were involved in shipping, others in moneylending. However they shared their openness to
European traders and were all active in raw cotton trade.
Parsis had the highest literacy compared to other communities, besides embracing western edu-
cation. They were brokers of the East India Company and also acted as suppliers in many towns in
the presidency. The Parsis moved early to Bombay city from the first Company settlement in Surat,
when the Company established a settlement in Bombay. They established shipbuilding in Bombay and
began to trade with China, mainly in raw cotton and opium. The Parsis were the dominant Indian
group in the China trade; a few of them maintained offices in Shanghai. Kamenar (1998) suggests
that the Parsis amassed enormous wealth through the opium trade, which ended with the Opium war;
thereafter the community became more involved in trade in raw cotton. With the end of the monopoly
of the East India Company in 1813, the number of European merchants in India increased, but did
not diminish the presence of Indian merchants in the city of Bombay. Davar, the Parsi pioneer among
cotton entrepreneurs, came from a Bombay based merchant family, which was involved in the opium
trade and had acted as agents of the East India Company, exporting raw cotton and importing cotton
cloth. Davar was involved in setting up the Commercial Bank of India in 1846. The family diversified
into shipping in the Indian Ocean and set up cotton press and baling facilities.
The Parsis were not the only community that engaged with the Europeans. In 17th and 18th
century, there was no difference between the Parsis and the Vanias, or Bohra and Khoja Muslims in
Surat as far as business connections or regions were concerned (Das Gupta 2001). The Vanias had a
large presence in Surat. Bhimji Parakh from the community of Vaishnava Vanias was one of the most
trusted brokers of the East India Company in Surat. The competition between the Parsis and the
Vanias for the brokerage of the East India Company led to feuds between the families. Table 2 shows
the importance of the various communities in Surat in the mid 18th century.
The Vania migrants to Bombay had a monopoly on informal banking, where the returns were 12-
22% in the period after the American civil war (Tripathi and Mehta 1990: p. 42). The opium trade
from producing region of Malwa was another activity of the Indian merchants and yielded a rate of
return of 15% (Ray 1994, p. 44). The returns in textile production had to be comparable to these
outside options. The profit rate from Khatau Makhanjis Spinning and Weaving mill set up in 1897 was
12% (Tripathi and Mehta, 1990, p. 78).
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Table 2: Non-European Trading Capital 1746 in Surat: Shares of communities (%)
European protection Independent Total
Armenian 0 5.9 5.9
Jew 1.2 0 1.2
Parsi 9.9 0 9.9
Hindu∗ 18.8 30.5 49.3
Muslim 2 31.7 33.7
Total 31.9 68.1 100
Source: Guha (1984). ∗ refers primarily to Bhatias and Va-
nias.
The Bhatias had an early involvement in the cotton textile industry. In the early 19th century,
they moved from Kutch, the peninsula of Bombay Presidency to Bombay city, where they had trading
connections from the 18th century. As a community, they were Hindu by religion, but less orthodox
than other Hindu trading groups. Moolji Thackersey, a Bhatia, was one of the prominent members of
the social reform movement in Bombay. The Bhatias were open to western education and were free of
many of the practices of the more orthodox communities. One of these was foreign travel, a taboo in
most orthodox Hindu communities. The Bhatias and the Parsis were able to travel to England and
establish links with machinery producers (Tripathi and Mehta 1990, pp. 77-78).
There were also several Muslim communities engaged in trade in Bombay, such as the Bohras and
the Khojas who were involved in shipping to Zanzibar and West Asia (Ray 1994, p. 41). When the
Parsis withdrew from the China trade, the Khojas and the Baghdadi Jews filled the gap (Bagchi 1987,
p.100). As the industry developed, a few acquired shares in the industrial firm in cotton textiles.
Ebrahim Curimbhoy set up his own firm during the 1880s (Tripathi 2004 p.124). The Baghdadi Jewish
group of the Sassoon family followed a similar path into textile production.
The Vanias were more prominent in the city of Ahmedabad, located close to Surat. In our analysis,
Ahmedabad and surroundings is a different location from Bombay and surrounding regions. Both were
located within Bombay Presidency. One is in the state of Maharashtra today and the other is in the
state of Gujarat. Despite being involved in the coastal trade and in supplying export goods for shipping,
they did not engage in foreign travel due to religious taboos and stayed away from the overseas China
trade. They were also engaged in moneylending, where the return was high. This group waited until
the fortunes of the industry were well established and the fortunes in money lending became uncertain.
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A series of new laws passed by the colonial authorities from the late 1870s regulating moneylending,
reduced the returns to such activities. As a consequence, the Vanias of Ahmedabad began to move
into industry, nearly two decades after other communities. Once they began to enter the downstream
cotton textile industry, they emerged as the largest group (Tripathi 2004, p. 116). We will verify these
patterns in our own data subsequently. They ended up owning a larger share of the industry in Bombay
Presidency (which included both Bombay and Ahmedabad) in 1911 compared to the Parsis (Bagchi
1994, p. 187). Nearly 80% of the spindles and 65% of the looms in 1898 were held by the Vanias.
Rancholdlals firm, which was set up early, alone accounted for 20% of the capacity (Mehta 1991: 195).
Community Characteristics vs Network Effect
A challenge to isolating the role of community networks in facilitating entry into industry is the problem
of distinguishing trends resulting from a dynamic network effect from trends in underlying community
characteristics. If some communities had privileged access to capital or enjoyed certain benefits due to
their connections with the British in India, and these were growing at rates positively correlated with
initial entry patterns, it would confound the effect of the dynamics generated by the social network itself.
We now discuss the evidence relating to differential trends in trading experience, wealth, education, or
outside options across the different communities.
The external environment or British policy did not favour any particular community. All potential
entrepreneurs faced tariffs and excise on textiles. There is no evidence that any particular community
was favoured by the British and gained certain advantage. All trading groups collaborated with the
British in trade as suppliers of raw materials and distributors of British goods. The Bank of Bombay
financed cotton traders in the early stages and later on provided short term capital to the cotton mills
(Bagchi 1987, p. 110). It is difficult to argue that any particular community had better access to
credit. All communities were involved in the management of the bank. Parsis, Bhatias, Baghdadi Jews,
Hindu and Muslim merchants were on the board of directors between 1876 and 1920 (Bagchi 1987,
Appendix). Several cotton textile firms belonging to different social groups enjoyed a high credit limit
with the bank discounting bills or borrowing against goods (Bagchi 1987, p. 337-8). They all relied on
getting deposits from the public on which interest was paid and on credit offered by British machinery
exporting firms.
The accumulation of wealth in trade and contact with Europeans was a common feature of all the
trading groups. They differed in initial endowment and outside options, which may have influenced
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the timing of their entry. The merchant castes enjoyed higher literacy than the average for the region.
But the Parsis were exceptional. In 1881, over 70% the Parsis were literate and 50% of the literates
had secondary education. 99% of the literates among European Christians had secondary education.
5% of the literate Parsis and 4% of the literate European Christians had college education. Other
communities were far less educated. The Hindu trading group had primary education and a very small
proportion went to college. Table 3 shows the differences in literacy rate among the different religious
groups. However, the key point to note is that literacy rates do not materially change over time for any
community. Nor do we see differential growth in population in Bombay city (Table 4) where most of
the cotton textile industry was located until the 1890s.
Table 3: Literacy by Community in Bombay Presidency (%)
1881 1891 1901
Hindu1 10.9 11.8 11.2
Parsi 72.9 76.3 75.2
Jain 51.5 53.4 48.9
Jewish 52.0 54.2 -
Muslim2 6.8 9.2 7.3
Christian 38.9 44.4 36.5
Total Bombay Presidency 11.1 12.6 11.67
Source: Censuses of India
1 Hindus include Bhatias and Vanias. The 1911 Cen-
sus shows male literacy for Bhatias was 56% and Va-
nias 60%.
2 Within Muslims, the 1911 Census shows male lit-
eracy rate of 41% among the trading communities of
Muslim Bohras, Khojas and Memons.
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Table 4: : Population Share in Bombay City by Community (%)
1864 1872 1881 1891 1901
Hindu1 64.1 63.4 65 - 65
Bhatia 2.7 1.5 1.2 - 1.2
Parsi 6 6.8 6.3 5.8 6
Jain 1 2.32 2.2 - 1.8
Jewish - 0.4 0.4 - 0.7
Muslim 17.8 21.4 20.4 18.9 20.13
European Christian 1 1.1 1.4 - 1.5
Source: 1872- 1891: The Gazetteer Bombay City and Island
1909.
1 Hindu includes Bhatias.
2 Includes Buddhists (only 2% of the Population in 1881).
1901 data comes from the Census.
3 Includes Bohra 1.5% and Khoja 1.4%.
What about alternative options of the different communities? The common pre-industrial activity
among these groups was trade in raw cotton. But they differed in other activities prior to 1850. The
groups that were involved in the opium and cotton trade were exposed to common trade shocks. The
trading communities of the Parsis, Bhatia, Baghdadi Jews and Muslim Khojas, who had also been
involved overseas trade moved into alternative activities in response to these adverse shocks. For
instance, the Opium Wars in China during the middle of the 19th century reduced the involvement in
opium for the Parsis. The Parsis mostly withdrew from the China trade to be replaced by the Khojas
and the Baghdadi Jews (Bagchi 1987, p. 100). The competition from European shipping from the late
1860s with the opening of the Suez Canal, made shipping unprofitable for the Indian merchants. Circa
1860-1964, most of their trading activities were concentrated in raw cotton. As the boom in cotton
trade during the American civil war ended, they then turned to the downstream industry.
There is no evidence of any significant change in outside options for these communities after the US
civil war. However the experience of the Vania traders in Ahmedabad was markedly different. Their
principal occupation was money lending until the late 1870s, where returns remained high until new
legal changes affected moneylending. The peasant riots against moneylenders in 1875 in the Deccan
region of Bombay Presidency, targeted to destroy debt records held by money lenders (Kranton and
Swamy 1999). Following the riots, the government became increasingly concerned about agrarian
distress from indebtedness and began to take the legal route to restrict moneylending. The Deccan
Agricultural Relief Act of 1879, which regulated interest rates on loans to agriculture was the first
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of a series of legal interventions. Consequently, industry became more attractive as a contender for
investment for the moneylenders from the 1880s onwards: the Vanias and Jains from Ahmedabad were
latecomers to the (downstream) cotton textile industry. The size of their population was substantially
larger than the Parsis, Bhatias and the Muslim trading groups in Bombay. Hence after 1890, this group
came to dominate the industry. For this reason we define the early stage of the industry as lasting for
1865-1890, focused mainly on entry into the Greater Bombay region where the leading communities
did not experience significant trends in outside options.
3 Cotton Industry: Data and Descriptive Statistics
Using business directories listing partners of listed firms, we collect data on names of every entrepreneur
in Bombay Presidency (Greater Bombay and Greater Ahmedabad) at the point of entry, and track their
previous and subsequent trajectories between 1860 and 1910. The data includes details of the firm that
the entrepreneur is listed in: location and in many cases the paid-up capital. From the names of the
entrepreneurs, we trace the community they belong to. Following the discussion in the preceding section,
we classify communities principally on the basis of religion and caste. Within Hindus, we distinguish
between the Bhatias and Vanias. For reasons explained earlier, the term ‘Vania’ will include Hindu and
Jain merchants.
We consider the early phase of development of the industry to determine the extent to which
community connections were important. Until 1890 most firms were situated in Bombay city, so there
is no possibility of confounding network effects with agglomeration effects. During this period only 6
out of 60 were outside Bombay city, two in Broach, two in Surat, one in Sholapur and one in Budnera.
All towns are in Bombay Presidency. We treat the region of Bombay and surroundings as distinct from
the region of Ahmedabad and surroundings. Hereafter, we refer to these locations as Greater Bombay
and Greater Ahmedabad.
15
Figure 1: Downstream sector (1860-1890)
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Figure 1 shows the evolution of the total number of entrepreneurs between 1860 and 1890, and
the breakdown between different communities. It shows steady growth in the number of entrepreneurs
entering in downstream industry between 1860-90. There is an upward spurt during 1875-80, followed
by periodic spurts during the 1880s. We also observe the dominance of the Parsis at the initial stage
and a pattern of non-linear divergence in the presence of different communities.
The role of prior wealth accumulation in the emergence of industrial entrepreneurship has been
stressed by Marxian theories of ‘primitive accumulation’ (see Marx 1887, chapter 26 and Harvey 2005)
as well as more recent theories of occupational choice in the presence of credit constraints and lumpiness
of industrial capital (Banerjee and Newman 1993). The capital required to set up a textile mill was
substantial. Morris (1982, p. 575) shows that it cost between Rs 500,000-one million to set up a
textile firm in Bombay in the early phase. Table 5 shows the capital needed to set up an industrial
firm. It shows that capital per firm in the downstream industry was twice as large as the capital in
the upstream firm during 1860-90. The upstream industry focused mainly on baling raw cotton, and
was technologically far less sophisticated than the downstream mills. For these reasons, we focus on
entry into the downstream industry, and treat the upstream industry as a related pre-industrial trading
activity. The substantial capital required to set up a firm in the downstream may explain why growth
in entry was gradual and took almost a decade after the end of the Civil War to accelerate further.
The opening of the stock market in 1875 may have facilitated the transition to a faster growth phase.
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Table 5: Capital per firm in Rupees
Upstream Downstream
Period mean median mean median
1860-1890 580,115 400,000 1,127,646 900,000
1891-1910 320,267 200,000 1,025,653 821,000
The role of prior experience in pre-industrial trade in entrepreneurship have been highlighted in the
recent ‘enterprise map’ studies from some contemporary African countries, which suggest pre-existing
upstream experience is an important determinant of entry into downstream industry (Sutton and Kellow
2010; Sutton and Kpentey 2012). To check the relevance of this, in the context of the Indian cotton
industry during the 19th century, we calculate the proportion of downstream entrants who had earlier
participated in the upstream industry. Figure 2 shows that less than 35% of the downstream entrants
had prior upstream experience. This proportion declined further over the subsequent periods. By 1890
less than 10% of the entrants had upstream experience.




























No upstream background Upstream background
Next, we examine clustering by community within firms. Figure 3 shows more than half of all
entrepreneurs within any firm belonged to the same community. Moreover, this proportion showed no
tendency to fall over time; during the 1880-90 decade, it rose to 66%. This suggests the continued
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importance of community links throughout successive decades, despite the growth of the stock market
and banking activity in Western India.




















Different community Same community
We turn next to developing a theoretical model of entry dynamics generated by community networks,
whose predictions can be tested using the data for the early period.
4 Network-based Model of Entry Dynamics
The model is closely related to Munshi (2011) and is a special case of Dai et al (2018) with a single
destination sector. There are successive cohorts of potential (infinitely lived) entrepreneurs (or agents,
in short) t = 1, 2, ... who have a once-and-for-all opportunity to enter the downstream industry at date
t. Their outside option is to continue pursuing their current occupation, e.g., trading or the upstream
stage of the same industry. The agents belong to different communities c = 1, ..., C. Individuals within
a community vary in their entrepreneurial ability ω, drawn from a log-uniform distribution whose mean
varies across communities. Specifically, log ω is distributed uniformly with mean log ωc and a constant
density s > 0 on support [logωc − 12s , logωc + 12s ]. We focus on early stages of the industry when there
are some potential entrants who do not actually enter, i.e. entry thresholds derived below lie in the
interior of the support of the distribution of ω, whence there remain further scope for entry flows to
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increase in future. The profit of an agent with individual ability ω in their outside option is Πcω
σ where
σ ∈ (0, 1).
We allow communities to differ in (levels of) underlying characteristics such as access to capital
(borrowing cost rc), ability (ωc) and outside options (Πc), while assuming the absence of any time
trends in these characteristics. On the other hand we abstract from differences in population sizes
of the stock of potential entrepreneurs across these communities. The historical evidence described
in previous sections suggests this is a reasonable assumption for the early stage of the cotton textile
industry in the Greater Bombay region. These assumptions fail to capture the experience of the Vanias
in the Greater Ahmedabad region who experienced a sharp drop in their outside options in the early
1880s and thereby began to enter in large numbers from the mid-1890s onwards. Hence we shall use
the model to generate predictions over the early stage of the industry until 1890.
Network effects in the downstream industry are represented by dependence of the total factor
productivity (TFP) of any entrepreneur from community c at any date T ≥ t on the presence of
incumbents from the same community at the end of the previous date T − 1, denoted by ncT−1. A





where K denotes capital size chosen by the entrepreneur, α ∈ (0, 1) represents diminishing returns to
capital, and the ‘community-based TFP’ (CTFP) is represented by
AcT = A0 exp{θncT−1} (2)
Underlying this formulation is the assumption that incumbents from the same community share knowhow
and help one another, to overcome the absence of government support or markets for knowhow or help.
Moreover, exchanges of different community members complement each other, giving rise to the expo-
nential form in which the size of the network enters (2). For instance, each entrepreneur relies on a
given level of informal help h > 0 provided by other members to raise productivity or market access:
AcT = A0(1 + γh)
ncT−1 , which reduces to expression (2) if we define θ ≡ log(1 + γh). θ > 0 is represents
the strength of the network effect, manifested by a productivity spillover among network members.
This formulation of spillovers differs from standard specifications of agglomeration spillovers in the
economic geography literature, insofar as the domain of the spillovers is restricted to entrepreneurs
from the same community (irrespective of location). In contrast, agglomeration effects are spillovers
are location-specific but do not vary by community origins of the entrepreneurs involved.
19
It is of course plausible that active collaboration is limited to social groups (based on family ties,
physical proximity or other sources of social association) which are smaller than the entire community.
In that case the definition of network size for any given agent should be the number of incumbents
from the same social group. If there are k social groups within the community, and mcT−1 denotes
the (average) number of incumbents from each social group, formulation (2) would be replaced by a
specification of the form
AcT = A0 exp{θ′mcT−1} (3)
for a representative agent of community c, which reduces to (2) if we define θ = θ
′
k .
The product price qT at date T is the same across all communities. Each entrepreneur and commu-
nity takes this price as given; we therefore abstract from possible collusive behavior. Capital size KcT is




Hence profits and capital size in the downstream industry satisfy




T−1 + log qT ]−
α
1− α log rc + logµ+
1
1− α logA0 (4)




T−1 + log qT ]−
1
1− α log rc +
1
1− α [logA0 + logα] (5)
where µ denotes [α
α
1−α − α 11−α ].
Entry decisions are irreversible: once an agent enters the downstream industry he stays there for
ever. It will be in the interest of every entrant to stay every period thereafter, so this assumption is
not restrictive. Entry decisions are also myopic and selfish: each cohort t agent decides whether to
enter based on a comparison of his own profit upon entering the industry at date t, with his outside
option. Extending the model to accommodate foresight makes it more complicated, while reinforcing
further the network effects. Hence myopia is a useful simplifying assumption. Similarly, extension to
incorporate some altruism towards fellow community members will also reinforce the network effects at
the cost of complicating the analysis considerably.
Hence a cohort t agent of ability ω will enter the downstream industry if log picT−1(ω) > log Πc +
σ logω, i.e. if ω exceeds the threshold ωct given by
logωct =
1
1− σ [log Πc +
α
1− α log rc − logµ−
1
1− α logA0 −
1
1− α{log qt + θn
c
t−1}] (6)
Since we have normalized the size of each community to 1, the entry flow into the downstream industry
at t is given by
ect =
s
(1− α)(1− σ) [θn
c
t−1 + log qt] + δc (7)
20




1−α logA0 − log Πc − α1−αrc] +
s logωc +
1
2 , which depends on mean ability, outside options and capital access of community members.







t−1 + P log qt + δc (8)
where M ≡ 1 + sθ(1−α)(1−σ) and P ≡ s(1−α)(1−σ) . M is the network multiplier parameter which exceeds 1
in the presence of network effects, and equals 1 otherwise. This parameter represents the incremental
effect of higher network size in any cohort on the network size in the succeeding cohort. The difference
equation (8) provides a simple expression for network size in any cohort as a function of size at some
historically pre-determined cohort 0 size, which we summarize in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The evolution of network size of community c given initial cohort size nc0 is given by
nct = M
tnc0 + δc[
M t − 1
M − 1 ] + P
t−1∑
k=0
Mk log qt−k (9)
in the presence of network effects (M > 1), and
nct = n
c




when they are absent (M = 1).
Network effects result in greater sensitivity of network size in later cohorts to initial network size:
∂nct
∂nc0
= M t which is rising in t when M > 1, and constant otherwise. This reflects the network multiplier
operating across successive cohorts, whereby one more member raises the number of members at the next
cohort by M , the one after that by M2 and so on. Initial differences in network size across communities
will be progressively magnified across time, a pattern of growing divergence. When communities differ
in characteristics summarized by δc, which appears as a community fixed effect in the entry equation
(7), this divergence will grow linearly over time when network effects are absent, and exponentially
otherwise.
Proposition 1 generates a strategy of identifying network effects when community characteristics
(ability, access to capital or outside options) summarized by δc are fixed over time. Taking a quadratic
approximation for M t = 1 + tζ + t2 ζ
2
2 , (9) generates the following regression specification for dynamics
of network size
















in the presence of network effects (ζ > 0). When network effects are absent, the regression is given
by (10) instead, where quadratic time trends do not appear. Hence the significance of quadratic time
trends, interacted either with initial network size nc0 or community characteristic δc, indicates the
presence of network effects. Since initial network size and community characteristics are perfectly
collinear, we cannot identify these two effects separately. But this is unnecessary, as the significance
of quadratic time trends with either identifies the presence of network effects. This would indicate
a pattern of divergence between the size of different communities among incumbents that is growing
faster than can be represented by differential linear time trends.
The key assumption underlying this identification strategy is that the community characteristics
are not varying over time at different rates. For instance an alternative non-network-based explanation
of the non-linear time varying effects of initial network presence nc0 in (9) is that the latter is positively
correlated with the growth of entry-facilitating community characteristics such as literacy, capital access
or declining outside options. We have argued in the previous section that while the communities differed
in the levels of these characteristics, there is no evidence that they differed in the rate at which they
changed over time.
5 Empirical Results for Cotton Entry
5.1 The Early Phase 1866-1890
We focus initially on the early period in the development of the downstream industry, following the US
Civil War years. The Civil War witnessed a boom in the upstream industry, resulting from a spike in
the world price of raw cotton owing to the suspension of supplies from the US South. As Figure 4 shows,
there was a sharp upward increase in the number of entrepreneurs and firms in the upstream, which
purchased raw cotton, and baled them for export. Once the War ended, the price of raw cotton exports
fell sharply, and the number of entrepreneurs in the upstream sector plateaued. In contrast, as Figure
1 shows, the downstream sector witnessed steady growth during the Civil War years, which continued
once the War ended. It accelerated after 1875, with occasional periods of stagnation interspersed with
rapid growth, resulting in a higher overall trend over 1875-90. The downstream industry followed a
different trajectory from the upstream because the former was producing cotton yarn or cloth mainly
for the domestic market rather than the international market. It is also evident from Figure 1 that
growth of the downstream industry was not driven by movements in the price of manufactured cloth.
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We now test the model developed in Section 4 using data for the downstream industry over 1866-
1890. The initial presence of each community (date 0 in the model) is represented by number of
entrepreneurs in the downstream industry in 1865. It also allows us to investigate the role of upstream
presence during the Civil War years, to test the role of prior trading experience in the same sector
and opportunity to earn large trading profits during the War years. We stop in 1890 for the reasons
explained in previous sections: the model would fail to capture the experience of the Vanias whose
outside options in moneylending contracted sharply in the 1880s, inducing them to enter in large
numbers into the downstream cotton industry from the 1890 onwards.
Table 6 shows the presence of different communities in the upstream and downstream industry
during the Civil War years. There were 38 entrepreneurs in 1865, dominated by Parsees, followed by
European and Vania communities, and also featuring a small number of Muslims, Bhatias and other
Indian communities.
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Column 1 of Table 7 shows regression results for the following regression specification based on (11),
run for the period 1866-1890:
nct = χn
c
0 ∗ t2 + δc ∗ t+ γc + νt + ct (12)
where nct denotes number of incumbent entrepreneurs from community c in year t, n
c
0 denotes average
downstream presence of community c entrepreneurs in 1865 when the US civil war ended, and t = 1
corresponds to year 1866. δc, γc are community dummies, νt is a year dummy representing (current
and lagged) price or other industry level shocks, and ct is an error term. Since community dummies
and initial presence either downstream or upstream are perfectly collinear, initial presence by itself
or interacted with linear time trend cannot be included in the regression once we include community
dummies or their interaction with a linear time trend. Conversely, we do not include community
dummies interacted with the quadratic time trend because the regression includes initial downstream
presence interacted with the quadratic time trend. The logic for using this specification is that under
the null hypothesis of no network effects (and community characteristics are not time-varying), (10)
applies and the coefficient χ of the interaction of the quadratic time trend with either initial downstream
presence or community dummies should be zero.
Column 1 in Table 7 shows this null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level. Column
2 shows the coefficients of the quadratic and linear time trends, which imply that one additional en-
trepreneur presence in 1865 was associated with 1.6 additional entrepreneurs in 1880 and 4.4 additional
entrepreneurs in 1890. Column 2 also shows that the estimated interaction of initial presence with
the non-linear trend is unaffected if we replace the interaction of linear time trend with community
dummies with initial presence instead. This suggests that variations in initial downstream presence
fully capture the effects of unobserved community characteristics.
Column 3 additionally replaces the (non-interacted) community dummies with both initial down-
stream and upstream presence. The estimated network multiplier is unaffected. Hence initial presence
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Table 7: Stock of entrepreneurs at community level (1866-1890)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
nc0 downstream ∗ t2 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)






L1 Log cotton price ratio 7.177
(4.449)
L2 Log cotton price ratio 10.693**
(4.209)
Year dummies Y Y Y N
Community dummies Y Y N Y
Community ∗ t Y N N Y
Observations 125 125 125 125
R-squared 0.960 0.952 0.902 0.934
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Intercept not reported
variables seem to proxy for the community dummies. The estimated coefficient of initial upstream
presence is negative and significant, while that of initial downstream presence is positive and signifi-
cant. This reinforces the evidence against hypotheses stressing the role of prior accumulation of sector
specific trading skills or wealth. Finally, Column 4 replaces year dummies in Column 1 by lagged price
ratio of manufactured goods and raw cotton. The two period lagged price ratio does significantly affect
the evolution of stocks. However, the nonlinear network effect remains positive and significant at the 1
percent level.
5.2 Evidence from the Longer Time Span 1860-1910
Figure 5 extends the time plot of presence of different communities until 1910. Figure 6 breaks this
down further between the Greater Bombay region and the Greater Ahmedabad region. There is a steep
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surge of entry between 1895-1900 in both regions, accounted mainly by the Vania community, who
collectively became the largest group in the industry. Figure 6 shows the emergence of the Greater
Ahmedabad region as a new location for the industry, dominated almost entirely by the Vanias. The
process of entry of these new groups resembles a cascade, being concentrated within a narrow 5-year
period, consistent with the hypothesis of strong community networks.


















































1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year




Figure 6: Entrepreneur stocks in the downstream sector by location (1860-1910)
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In effect the Vanias in the Greater Ahmedabad region represented the arrival of a new community,
most likely due to the shrinkage of their moneylending business. As they were absent in the mid-1860s,
the network-based model would obviously fail to capture this on the basis of presence in 1865. Other
assumptions of the network model would also cease to be valid after some time, such as the scope for
entry rates to continue to rise further. After some time, a community may have entered sufficiently
to exhaust any further scope for their entry rates to rise further. Indeed, Figures 5 and 6 show that
presence of different communities in the greater Bombay region tended to plateau after 1900, while
Vanias continued to enter in the greater Ahmedabad region. For all these reasons it does not seem
sensible to extend the regression in Table 7 to the longer time span.
However, to confirm our hypothesis that the growth of the industry beyond 1890 still featured the
importance of community networks, we check the extent of clustering by community within firms until
1910 in Figure 7. The presence of the largest community among partners rose to above 75% after 1890.
Figure 8 breaks this down by location. Entry into the greater Ahmedabad region after 1890 exhibits
even larger clustering than the greater Bombay region, with nearly 90% of entrepreneurs from the same
community. Moreover, prior upstream experience was even less important for the late entrants than
for the previous entrants (Figure 9).
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Figure 8: Community concentration in firms at entry by location (1860-1910)
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6 Entry Patterns in the Jute Industry
Unlike Bombay, the commercial life of Calcutta was dominated by British firms. While Bombay was
the hub of British capital, Calcutta was the centre of British firms in tea, coal and jute. The investors
were British residents in India and in Britain. The industry we focus on is jute, for a number of reasons:
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until 1930 this was the most important instance of entry by Indian entrepreneurs after cotton. Jute is
also closest to cotton textiles in terms of technology and capital requirements. It developed with British
entrepreneurship from mid 19th century. Like tea, jute was mainly sold in the export markets and the
British firms had an advantage in the export trade. In 1866, there were four British firms in jute.
From the mid 1870s, the industry expanded rapidly and by 1900 there were 32 British firms, and no
Indian firms. The situation changed with the first World War, following which Indian entrepreneurship
became visible for the first time.
Indian presence in Calcuttas entrepreneurs has always been low compared to Bombay. The Marwari
traders, the dominant group among Indian communities in eastern India, were involved in money
lending, trade, brokerage and speculation and stayed away from industry until the first World War
(Tripathi 2004, p.166) The futures market in opium, gold specie and later raw jute and hessian was
started by the Marwaris and became the focus of speculation. Several Marwaris first created their wealth
in the opium trade. Among them, Birla, Hukumchand and Chamaria were key players (Timberg 1978,
p160-61). While the export trade in raw jute and jute textiles had been controlled by the Europeans
before the war, from 1914 Marwaris traders Birla and Hukumchand became involved in this trade
(Bagchi 1994, p.179).
Another market for speculation for the Marwaris was in shares (Goswami 1985). All British Manag-
ing Agency Houses which managed and controlled firms across various industries in eastern India, had
Marwari brokers. The close contact of the Marwari families with British firms opened up a channel of
their entry into the industry. Unlike cotton textiles, the entry of Indian traders into the jute industry
happened mainly through acquisition of shares in British firms rather than starting new firms.
The first World War created a shock for the jute industry, just as the American civil war had been
in the case of cotton half a century earlier. As demand for jute goods increased, raw jute prices rose;
share prices of jute firms rose 8-10 times (Goswami 1985). Many British shareholders sold shares to
their Marwari contacts. The Marwaris also lent short term capital to British firms against a collateral
of shares. Both interactions allowed the Marwaris to get elected on the boards of British Companies.
In 1918, of the 114 directors in British owned jute firms, only 3 were Marwaris. By 1924, of the 46
British firms, 19 had Marwari directors on their boards (Goswami 1985). Two Indian firms were set up
in 1918 by Birla and Hukumchand. While Hukumchands firm was primarily self-financed, capital for
Birlas firm was raised more widely (Timberg 1978, p171). These initial stock of entrepreneurs opened
up the way for further entry both into British firms and setting up of new Indian firms after the War,
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which continued until the beginning of the Great Depression.
Figure 10 shows entry into the downstream jute industry from 1914 to 1930. Until 1918, only a
handful of Indian entrepreneurs from three communities were present: Marwaris, Baghdadi Jews and
Bengali. After 1918, there was a steep rise in Marwari entry.
Figure 10: Entrepreneur stocks in the Jute downstream sector (1914-1930)
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Figure 11: Relevance of upstream background in downstream entry
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Figure 12: Community concentration in firms at entry (1914-1930)
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Figure 11 shows that Indian entrants hardly had any upstream experience at all. Figure 12 shows
the extent of clustering by communities within firms. More than half the partners within the average
firm belonged to the same community. The clustering was the largest (58%) among the Marwaris,
the dominant Indian community. The extent of clustering was slightly smaller than observed in the
early phases of the cotton textile industry. This is perhaps explained by the tendency of Marwari
entrepreneurs to enter by acquiring shares in existing firms from British investors.
Finally, we test the model of network-based dynamics by using a regression specification analogous
to that used for the cotton industry in Table 8. We find a similar significant positive effect of initial
community presence interacted with the squared time trend. Once again at the initial stage of the
development of the industry, social networks therefore appear to have played an important role.
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Table 8: Stock of entrepreneurs at community level (1919-1930)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
nc0 downstream ∗ t2 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)






L1 Log jute price ratio 1.791
(1.275)
L2 Log jute price ratio 3.692
(2.332)
Year dummies Y Y Y N
Community dummies Y Y N Y
Community ∗ t Y N N Y
Observations 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.995 0.993 0.988 0.992
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Intercept not reported
7 Concluding Comments
This paper has presented evidence from 19th century India on the role played by community networks
in early stages of industrialization in less developed countries, when supporting market institutions
and state support are missing. We have put together data on individual entrepreneurs in the cotton
and jute industry, thus filling a gap in the literature (e.g., Bagchi (1994, p. 185) states: ”No detailed
figures on the distributions of directorships among various Indian communities are available”). We
use this data to show that community connections were important in early entry. Entrants tended to
join firms dominated by entrepreneurs from the same community. Presence of communities in the early
stages predict presence several decades later, consistent with the hypothesis that help provided by early
incumbents facilitated entry of entrepreneurs from the same community. These results obtain despite
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controlling for fixed differences in community characteristics, varying prices and other time varying
shocks in the industry.
Related questions of interest that seem interesting include patterns of later evolution of these indus-
tries. In the case of cotton, we saw this consisted of emergence of new locations and new communities
at the turn of the 19th century. Our network-based model was not suitable to model the arrival of new
communities, or the interaction between different communities. Nor was it useful in testing whether
community links became less important at later stages as market and state institutions developed.
Another related question is explaining causes of delayed entry by specific communities or delayed in-
dustrialization in specific regions. In the case of cotton, the later development of the greater Ahmedabad
region is possibly explained by the disappearance of the primary pre-industrial occupation (moneylend-
ing) of the relevant community (Vanias and Jains) following the Deccan riots in the 1870s. In similar
vein, delayed entry into industrialization in South India by the community of Chettiars (after 1930s) is
possibly explained by the decline of their moneylending activities in Burma in the wake of the Great
Depression. Conversely, the early lead of the Bombay region may have owed to the earlier disappear-
ance of profitable trading opportunities in opium and shipbuilding enjoyed by Western Indian business
communities. Hence lack of pre-industrial accumulation of wealth or skill in related trading sectors
seems unlikely to explain delayed industrialization in other regions. On the contrary, these delays prob-
ably arose precisely owing to the continued profitability of these pre-industrial trading opportunities,
which reduced the incentive of the concerned communities to enter industry. Exploring this hypothesis
remains an interesting task for future research.
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We have several data sources which we collected and digitalized in function to our requirements. In this
paper, we constructed firms and entrepreneurs panels for cotton and jute industry in India, between
1850 and 1930.
Our data gather information from before the first waves of industralization, documenting the pres-
ence of cotton merchants and jute balers, and up to 1930 with the impact of the Great Depression. In
cotton sector, industralization started right after the American civil war, while in jute sector was more
evident in early 1900s.
8.1.1 Cotton industry registers
“The Bombay Almanac, Directory, and Register”, (1806 - 1868)
We construct the List of Merchants, from the records of firms and partners’ names organised by
professions for years: 1840, 1850, 1855, 1860, 1865. In this dataset is also available the list of
Joint Stock Companies from 1860 onward.
“ Bombay Calendar and Almanac”, (1853 - 1861)
From this dataset we only use years 1860 and 1861, where we obtain: (i) the list of firms, location,
and capital; (ii) the list of entrepreneurs and individual occupation.
“Times of India Calendar and Directory (Bombay)”, (1862-1887)
We use this dataset for the period (1862 - 1884), where we collect: (i) the list of firms, location,
and capital; (ii) the list of entrepreneurs and individual occupation.
“Thacker’s Indian Directory (Bombay)”, (1885 - 1960)
This is our main data source, which we use from year 1885 onward. From here we construct: (i)
the list of firms, location, and capital; (ii) the list of entrepreneurs and individual occupation.
8.1.2 Jute industry registers
“New Calcutta Directory” (1856 - 1863)
We construct yearly cross sections between 1860 and 1869: (i) the list of firms, location, and
capital; (ii) the list of entrepreneurs and individual occupation.
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“Thackers Bengal Directory” (1863 - 1884)
From this dataset we construct yearly cohorts from 1870 to 1875, in addition to 1880. The
information found in the directory is: (i) the list of firms, location, and capital; (ii) the list of
entrepreneurs and individual occupation.
“Thacker’s Indian Directory (Calcutta)”, (1885 - 1960)
This dataset is used to obtain: (i) the list of jute balers; (ii) the list of firms, location, and capital;
(iii) the list of entrepreneurs and individual occupation.
From 1885 to 1905 we collected data every five years, and form 1905 we construct our yearly
cohorts up to 1930.
8.1.3 Cotton and jute prices
“Index Number of Indian Prices” India Office Records (1861-1931)
The most relevant pieces of information extracted from this source are the following:
Exported articles: (i) Cotton, Raw Broach (Bombay) per candy of 784 lb; (ii) Cot-
ton, Manufactured Yarn 20s (Bombay) per lb and T. cloth (Bombay) per lb (only between
1874-1931); (iii) Jute, Raw Picked & Ordinary (Calcutta). Per bale of 400 lb.; (iv) Jute,
Manufactured: Gunny bags (Calcutta). Per bale of 100 lb
Imported articles: (i) Cotton, Manufactured Grey shirtings (Calcutta) and Grey yarn
Banner Mill (Calcutta)
8.1.4 Entrepreneur and firm panels construction
We first pooled yearly cross-section cohorts with all firms in upstream and downstream sector. From
each firm we obtain the names of partners, directors and managing agents. Each of them were associated
to a community origin, which defined the firm’s community by simple majority. Raw and manufactured
cotton (and jute) prices from the Index Number of Indian Prices were yearly assigned to entrepreneurs
and firms panels.
Entrepreneurs panel collapses yearly information at individual level, as a single entrepreneur could
be part of more than one firm in the same or different sector during the same year. Therefore, in our
panel we are able to identify whether an entrepreneur is incumbent in one sector and later entrant in
the other. Information on capital requirement is summarised at individual level as well.
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Firms panel gathers all relevant information at entrepreneurs level, such us proportion of community
origins yearly per firm. For each firm we assigned code or ID, which enables to track the same firm
despite of firm’s names changes. The location of firms is obtained from registered office address, and
mills or presses location.
Cross section cohorts for cotton industry panels: (1860-61) Bombay Calendar and Al-
manac; (1862-1884) Times of India Calendar and Directory (Bombay); (1885-1910) Thacker’s
Indian Directory (Bombay); (1910-1930) for every five years Thacker’s Indian Directory (Bom-
bay)
Cross section cohorts for cotton jute panels: (1860-1869) New Calcutta Directory ; (1870-
1875) Thackers Bengal Directory ; (1885-1905) for every five years Thacker’s Indian Directory
(Calcutta); (1905-1930) Thacker’s Indian Directory (Calcutta)
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